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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59656
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Galperti, Simone | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-07-12T12:33:57Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-07-12T12:33:57Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59656 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal, Myerson's Inscrutability Principle fails when there are many informed principals. I also find that, in contrast with common agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which principals offer their mechanisms without randomizing. I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus of direct revelation mechanisms, to which they truthfully report their types. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanston | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1541 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D83 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | common agency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | informed principals | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Inscrutability Principle | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Delegation Principle | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | menus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | signals | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | direct revelation mechanisms | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 672632160 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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