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dc.contributor.authorGalperti, Simoneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:57Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59656-
dc.description.abstractI analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal, Myerson's Inscrutability Principle fails when there are many informed principals. I also find that, in contrast with common agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which principals offer their mechanisms without randomizing. I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus of direct revelation mechanisms, to which they truthfully report their types.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1541en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformed principalsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInscrutability Principleen_US
dc.subject.keywordDelegation Principleen_US
dc.subject.keywordmenusen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddirect revelation mechanismsen_US
dc.titleCommon agency with informed principals: Menus and signalsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn672632160en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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