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dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEkmekci, Mehmeten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:52Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59648-
dc.description.abstractIn a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent. Behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus. The frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium. Even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible, they affect the terms of trade and efficiency. In an unbalanced market where the entering flow of one side is short, there is one-sided reputation building in bargaining, and commitment types on the short side determine the terms of trade. In a balanced market where the entering flows are equal, there is twosided reputation building in bargaining, and reputation concerns lead to inefficiency. An equilibrium with persistent delays is constructed. The magnitude of inefficiency is determined by the demands of the commitment types and is independent of their frequency. Access to the market exacerbates bargaining inefficiencies caused by behavioral types, even at the frictionless limit of complete rationality.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1508en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordReputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordSearchen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Matchingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWar-of-Attritionen_US
dc.titleBargaining and reputation in search marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn63769791Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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