Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59645
Authors: 
Atakan, Alp E.
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1507
Abstract: 
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
Subjects: 
Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
JEL: 
C73
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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