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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59645
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| Title: | | Reputation with long run players and imperfect  |
| Authors: | | Atakan, Alp E. Ekmekci, Mehmet |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1507 |
| Abstract: | | We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game. |
| Subjects: | | Repeated Games Reputation Equal Discount Factor Long-run Players |
| JEL: | | C73 D83 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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