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Title:Reputation with long run players and imperfect PDF Logo
Authors:Atakan, Alp E.
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1507
Abstract:We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
Subjects:Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
JEL:C73
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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