Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628
Authors: 
González-Díaz, Julio
Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1446
Abstract: 
Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Subjects: 
non-cooperative game theory
equilibrium concepts
perfect bayesian
Bayes rule
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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