EconStor >
Northwestern University >
Kellogg School of Management - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University  >
Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation PDF Logo
Authors:Atakan, Alp E.
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1506
Abstract:Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finite automata. In this context, for a restricted class of stage games, we provide a one sided reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then player 1 receives his highest pay-off, compatible with individual rationality, in any Bayes-Nash equilibria, as agents become patient.
Subjects:Repeated Games
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
Imperfect Observation
Complicated Types
Finite Automaton
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
637697413.pdf313.46 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.