Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59624
Authors: 
Atakan, Alp E.
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1506
Abstract: 
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finite automata. In this context, for a restricted class of stage games, we provide a one sided reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then player 1 receives his highest pay-off, compatible with individual rationality, in any Bayes-Nash equilibria, as agents become patient.
Subjects: 
Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
Imperfect Observation
Complicated Types
Finite Automaton
JEL: 
C73
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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