Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59621 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1490
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive retention (i.e., inefficiently low turnover) at all tenure levels, or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure.
Schlagwörter: 
managerial turnover
termination clauses
dynamic mechanism design
adverse selection
moral hazard
JEL: 
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
388.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.