Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59579
Authors: 
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
Teichmann, Isabel
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 62
Abstract: 
We explore the strategic role of private quality standards in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the suppliers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the retailers' quality requirements. Our results reveal that the retailers use private quality standards to improve their bargaining position in the intermediate goods market. This is associated with inefficiencies in the upstream production, which can be mitigated by enforcing a minimum quality standard.
Subjects: 
private quality standards
vertical relations
buyer power
food supply chain
JEL: 
L15
L42
Q13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-061-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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