Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59525 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 12-036
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.
Subjects: 
antitrust policy
private enforcement
cartels
overcharge
damages
cement
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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