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dc.contributor.authorAndres, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorFernau, Eriken_US
dc.contributor.authorTheissen, Eriken_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-28T09:51:33Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2012-06-28T09:51:33Z; end=2013-08-27-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59510-
dc.description.abstractIn the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors as well as for their former colleagues. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms and the period 1998-2007. We show that firms in which a former CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors pay their executives significantly more. We find no difference in the compensation for the members of the supervisory board. Thus, former CEOs apparently exert their influence to increase the pay of their former colleagues and their successor, but not their own pay.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCentre for Financial Research Cologneen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFR Working Paper 12-02en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexecutive compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordboard structureen_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-tiered boarden_US
dc.subject.stwManagervergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsraten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleIs it better to say goodbye? When former executives set executive payen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717850889en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1202-
Appears in Collections:CFR Working Papers, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Universität Köln

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