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dc.contributor.authorDuso, Tomasoen_US
dc.contributor.authorGugler, Klausen_US
dc.contributor.authorSzücs, Florianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-26T11:00:09Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-26T11:00:09Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-057-4en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59505-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness based on standard oligopoly theory and stock market reactions. We focus on four different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty, 2) decision errors, 3) reversion of anti-competitive rents, and 4) deterrence. We apply this framework to 368 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission (EC) between 1990 and 2007. To evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation, we compare the results of the four tests before and after its introduction in 2004. Our results suggest that the 'more economic approach' resulted in improved ex-ante predictability of decisions and a reduction of the frequency of type I errors. Merger policy enforcement deters anti-competitive mergers without over-deterring pro-competitive transactions. Yet, the policy shift away from prohibitions, which are effective as a policy tool and as a deterrent mechanism, does not seem to be well-grounded.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 58en_US
dc.subject.jelL4en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelC13en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmerger controlen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulatory reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordEU Commissionen_US
dc.subject.keywordevent-studyen_US
dc.subject.stwFusionskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwReformen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleAn empirical assessment of the 2004 EU merger policy reformen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn718207939en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:58-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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