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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen_US
dc.contributor.authorLucca, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59499-
dc.description.abstractWe build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he attacks a non-hostile country. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. Using the Polity IV dataset, we classify countries as full democracies, limited democracies, and dictatorships. For the period 1816-200, Correlates of War data suggest that limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the political regime is changing. In particular, a dyad of limited democracies is more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other dyad (including mixed dyads, where the two countries have different regime types). Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war. We also find that as the environment becomes more hostile, fully democratic countries become more aggressive faster than other regime types.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,07en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddemocracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpeaceen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Systemen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwFriedenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleDomestic political survival and international conflict: Is democracy good for peace?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612504468en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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