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dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen
dc.contributor.authorMcLean, Richard P.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-15-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495-
dc.description.abstractWe prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. In addition, we provide a link between upper semicontinuity of a potential and conditions defined directly on the payoff functions of a potential game. Finally, we show that stable sets and (strictly) perfect equilibria are related to the set of maximizers of a potential, which refines the set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of maximizers of a potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium) and, for generic games, any maximizer of a potential is a pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2011-25en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuous gameen
dc.subject.keywordpotential gameen
dc.subject.keywordtrembling-hand perfect equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordstable seten
dc.subject.keywordessential equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRefinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn662136764en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:201125en

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