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Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | McLean, Richard P. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-15 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. In addition, we provide a link between upper semicontinuity of a potential and conditions defined directly on the payoff functions of a potential game. Finally, we show that stable sets and (strictly) perfect equilibria are related to the set of maximizers of a potential, which refines the set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of maximizers of a potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium) and, for generic games, any maximizer of a potential is a pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibrium. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJ | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2011,25 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | discontinuous game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | potential game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | trembling-hand perfect equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | stable set | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | essential equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nash-Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 662136764 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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