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Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Baliga, Sandeep | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sjostrom, Tomas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-11-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJ | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,06 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | global strategy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politischer Konflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politische Gewalt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Signalling | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The strategy of manipulating conflict | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 612504107 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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