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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen_US
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494-
dc.description.abstractTwo decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,06en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal strategyen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe strategy of manipulating conflicten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612504107en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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