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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494
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| Title: | | The strategy of manipulating conflict  |
| Authors: | | Baliga, Sandeep Sjostrom, Tomas |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,06 |
| Abstract: | | Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements. |
| Subjects: | | global strategy |
| JEL: | | C7 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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