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dc.contributor.authorShino, Junnosukeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T12:01:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T12:01:45Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59487-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study delegation environments based on Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK). By imposing a certain assumption on the notion of implementability, called implementability with mutually rational agents, they show that every efficient outcome can be fully implemented in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). For their analysis, we first argue that FJK's model can and should be interpreted as a problem in mechanism design. With this in mind, we first modify their model so that agents' participation decision is explicitly built in. Then, we argue that FJK uses a non-standard solution concepts in the mechanism design literature - in order to attain full implementability, they strengthen notion of implementability, instead of using a refined equilibrium concept. In response, we follow the standard mechanism design approach - employ a refined SPNE (weakly undominated SPNE, U-SPNE) as the equilibrium concept, while keeping the notion of the implementability unchanged. By applying U-SPNE, we show that in certain classes of 2x2 games - including prisoners' dilemma, coordination games, and battle of sexes - every efficient outcome is fully implementable in U-SPNE.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2012,02en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD04en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordImplementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordDelegation Gameen_US
dc.title2x2 delegation games with implementability in weakly undominated SPNEen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715700804en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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