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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen_US
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen_US
dc.description.abstractStag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,05en_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.titleConflict games with payoff uncertaintyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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