Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59483
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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen_US
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:30Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59483-
dc.description.abstractStag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey |cNew Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |x2009,05en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleConflict games with payoff uncertaintyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn61250381Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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