Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59483
Authors: 
Baliga, Sandeep
Sjostrom, Tomas
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2009,05
Abstract: 
Stag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).
Subjects: 
conflict
global games
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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