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dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcLean, Richarden_US
dc.description.abstractWe provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new finitistic infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2011,28en_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuous gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibrium correspondenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordpayoff securityen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrembling-hand perfect equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimit-of-finite perfect equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleApproximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinementen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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