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| Title: | | Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement  |
| Authors: | | Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol McLean, Richard |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2011,28 |
| Abstract: | | We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new finitistic infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification. |
| Subjects: | | discontinuous game Nash equilibrium correspondence payoff security trembling-hand perfect equilibrium limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium |
| JEL: | | C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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