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dc.contributor.authorShino, Junnosukeen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and keep the notion of the implementability unchanged. We first point out that optimal price setting behaviors derived by the assumption of mutually rational players in FJK are hard to justify from a standard game theory view in that they are assumed to play a weakly dominated strategy even when each of them has the weakly dominant strategy. Next, it is shown that there exists a compensation scheme fully implementing the most collusive outcome in which firms jointly set the monopoly price and equally share the profit.en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2012,03en_US
dc.subject.keywordBertrand Price Competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordDelegation Gameen_US
dc.titleBertrand delegation games with implementability in weakly undominated SPNEen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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