Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59479 
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dc.contributor.authorShino, Junnosukeen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-15-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:27Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59479-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and keep the notion of the implementability unchanged. We first point out that optimal price setting behaviors derived by the assumption of mutually rational players in FJK are hard to justify from a standard game theory view in that they are assumed to play a weakly dominated strategy even when each of them has the weakly dominant strategy. Next, it is shown that there exists a compensation scheme fully implementing the most collusive outcome in which firms jointly set the monopoly price and equally share the profit.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2012-03en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD04en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBertrand Price Competitionen
dc.subject.keywordDelegation Gameen
dc.subject.keywordImplementationen
dc.titleBertrand delegation games with implementability in weakly undominated SPNE-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715701347en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:201203en

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