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dc.contributor.authorBubb, Ryanen_US
dc.contributor.authorKaufman, Alexen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-20T16:10:01Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-20T16:10:01Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59243-
dc.description.abstractCredit score cutoff rules result in very similar potential borrowers being treated differently by mortgage lenders. Recent research has used variation induced by these rules to investigate the connection between securitization and lender moral hazard in the recent financial crisis. However, the conclusions of such research depend crucially on understanding the origin of these cutoff rules. We offer an equilibrium model in which cutoff rules are a rational response of lenders to perapplicant fixed costs in screening. We then demonstrate that our theory fits the data better than the main alternative theory already in the literature, which supposes cutoff rules are exogenously used by securitizers. Furthermore, we use our theory to interpret the cutoff rule evidence and conclude that mortgage securitizers were in fact aware of and attempted to mitigate the moral hazard problem posed by securitization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of Boston Boston, MAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPublic policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 09,5en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG01en_US
dc.subject.jelG18en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelN22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwSecuritizationen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSubprime-Hypotheken_US
dc.subject.stwKreditwürdigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleSecuritization and moral hazard: Evidence from a lender cutoff ruleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn621217352en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Public Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

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