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Title:Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from a lender cutoff rule PDF Logo
Authors:Bubb, Ryan
Kaufman, Alex
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Public policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 09,5
Abstract:Credit score cutoff rules result in very similar potential borrowers being treated differently by mortgage lenders. Recent research has used variation induced by these rules to investigate the connection between securitization and lender moral hazard in the recent financial crisis. However, the conclusions of such research depend crucially on understanding the origin of these cutoff rules. We offer an equilibrium model in which cutoff rules are a rational response of lenders to perapplicant fixed costs in screening. We then demonstrate that our theory fits the data better than the main alternative theory already in the literature, which supposes cutoff rules are exogenously used by securitizers. Furthermore, we use our theory to interpret the cutoff rule evidence and conclude that mortgage securitizers were in fact aware of and attempted to mitigate the moral hazard problem posed by securitization.
JEL:D82
G01
G18
G21
G24
G28
N22
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Public Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

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