EconStor >
Yale University >
Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >
Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59154
  
Title:Commitment contracts PDF Logo
Authors:Bryan, Gharad
Karlan, Dean S.
Nelson, Scott
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center 980
Abstract:We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices. A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the importance of further research exploring soft commitments those involving only psychological costs and the welfare consequences of hard commitments those involving actual costs especially in the presence of bounded rationality.
Subjects:consumer/household economics
institutional and behavioral economics
JEL:D03
D14
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
612123901.pdf246.29 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59154

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.