Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58902 
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dc.contributor.authorDoerrenberg, Philippen
dc.contributor.authorDuncan, Denvilen
dc.contributor.authorFuest, Clemensen
dc.contributor.authorPeichl, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-04-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:57:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:57:31Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201203064057en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58902-
dc.description.abstractThis paper is the first to provide evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of 'tax morale'. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that 'nice guys finish last': groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6275en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.jelH3en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax moraleen
dc.subject.keywordtax complianceen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.stwSteuermoralen
dc.subject.stwSteuerbelastungen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleNice guys finish last: Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715204203en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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