Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58902
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dc.contributor.authorDoerrenberg, Philippen_US
dc.contributor.authorDuncan, Denvilen_US
dc.contributor.authorFuest, Clemensen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeichl, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:57:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:57:31Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201203064057-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58902-
dc.description.abstractThis paper is the first to provide evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of 'tax morale'. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that 'nice guys finish last': groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x6275en_US
dc.subject.jelH2en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax moraleen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax complianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuermoralen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSch├Ątzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleNice guys finish last: Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715204203en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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