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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58549
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| Title: | | Testing canonical tournament theory: On the impact of risk, social preferences and utility structure  |
| Authors: | | Sheremeta, Roman M. Wu, Steven Y. |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6304 |
| Abstract: | | We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed. |
| Subjects: | | tournaments experiment social preferences contract theory |
| JEL: | | D03 D82 D86 M52 M55 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-201204239613 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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