Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58517
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dc.contributor.authorPowdthavee, Nattavudhen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiyanto, Yohanes E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:38:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:38:57Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201301212288-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58517-
dc.description.abstractWe investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010), we show empirically that the answer is yes and that the size of the error made systematically by people is large.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x6557en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgambler's fallacyen_US
dc.subject.keywordhot-handen_US
dc.subject.keywordrandom streaken_US
dc.subject.keywordexpertiseen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformationen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSachverständigeen_US
dc.subject.stwGlücksspielen_US
dc.titleWhy do people pay for useless advice? Implications of gambler's and hot-hand fallacies in false-expert settingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn716019329en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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