Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58517 
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dc.contributor.authorPowdthavee, Nattavudhen
dc.contributor.authorRiyanto, Yohanes E.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-23-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:38:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:38:57Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201301212288en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58517-
dc.description.abstractWe investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010), we show empirically that the answer is yes and that the size of the error made systematically by people is large.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6557en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordgambler's fallacyen
dc.subject.keywordhot-handen
dc.subject.keywordrandom streaken
dc.subject.keywordexpertiseen
dc.subject.keywordinformationen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSachverständigeen
dc.subject.stwGlücksspielen
dc.titleWhy do people pay for useless advice? Implications of gambler's and hot-hand fallacies in false-expert setting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn716019329en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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