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dc.contributor.authorBuonanno, Paoloen_US
dc.contributor.authorMastrobuoni, Giovannien_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:38:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:38:46Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2012080812144-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58510-
dc.description.abstractThis paper exploits dictated delays in local police hiring by a centralized national authority to break the simultaneity between police and crime. In Italy police officers can only be hired through lengthy national public contests which the Parliament, the President, and the Court of Auditors need to approve. Typically it takes three years before the requested police officers are recruited and become operational. We show that this endogeneity vanishes once, controlling for countrywide year effects, we use positive changes in the number of police officers. The availability of data on two police forces, specialized in fighting different crimes, provides convincing counterfactual evidence on the robustness of our results. Despite the inefficient hiring system, regular Italian police forces seem to be as efficient in fighting crimes as the US ones, with two notable exceptions: auto thefts and burglaries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6477en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.jelH76en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpoliceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrimeen_US
dc.subject.stwPolizeien_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwDaueren_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titlePolice and crime: Evidence from dictated delays in centralized police hiringen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715964062en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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