Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58405
Authors: 
Schipper, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,5
Abstract: 
How can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent, in time periods, and in the discount rate. As an interesting example outside this class of games we present a repeated textbook-like Cournot duopoly with non-negative prices and show that the optimal control strategy involves a cycle.
Subjects: 
strategic teaching
learning
adaptive heuristics
dynamic optimization
strategic substitutes
strategic complements
myopic players
JEL: 
C70
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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