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dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkharden_US
dc.description.abstractHow can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent, in time periods, and in the discount rate. As an interesting example outside this class of games we present a repeated textbook-like Cournot duopoly with non-negative prices and show that the optimal control strategy involves a cycle.en_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,5en_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic teachingen_US
dc.subject.keywordadaptive heuristicsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic optimizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic substitutesen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic complementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmyopic playersen_US
dc.titleStrategic control of myopic best reply in repeated gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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