EconStor >
University of California (UC) >
UC Davis, Department of Economics >
Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58395
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkharden_US
dc.contributor.authorWoo, Hee Yeulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:34:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:34:03Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58395-
dc.description.abstractIn modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. This is the context in which we analyze electoral competition between two ideologically fixed candidates and a finite set of voters. Each political issue corresponds to a dimension of a multidimensional policy space in which candidates' and voters' most preferred policy points are located. Candidates can target messages to subsets of voters. A candidate's message consists of a subset of issues and some information on her political position in the subspace spanned by this subset of issues. The information provided can be vague, it can be even silent on some issues, but candidates are not allowed to bluntly lie about their ideology. Every voter votes for the candidate she expects to be closest to her but takes into account only the subspace spanned by the issues that come up during the campaign. We show that any prudent rationalizable election outcome is the same as if voters have full awareness of issues and complete information of policy points, both in parliamentary and presidential elections. We show by examples that these results depend on the strength of electoral competition, the ability to target information to voters, and the political reasoning abilities of voters.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 12,4en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultidimensional policy spaceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmicrotargetingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddog-whistle politicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordideological candidatesen_US
dc.subject.keywordverifiable informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordunawarenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordframingen_US
dc.subject.keywordprudent rationalizabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordforward-inductionen_US
dc.titlePolitical awareness and microtargeting of voters in electoral competitionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717283542en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
717283542.pdf729.5 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.