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|Title:||Pure saddle points and symmetric relative payoff games |
Schipper, Burkhard C.
|Issue Date:||2010 |
|Series/Report no.:||Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 10,4|
|Abstract:||It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further suffiient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.|
|Subjects:||symmetric two-player games|
finite population evolutionary stable strategy
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis|
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