Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58384
Authors: 
Heifetz, Aviad
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 09,10
Abstract: 
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.
Subjects: 
unawareness
extensive-form games
extensive-form rationalizability
prudent rationalizability
iterative conditional dominance
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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