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Title:Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior PDF Logo
Authors:Heifetz, Aviad
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 09,10
Abstract:We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.
Subjects:unawareness
extensive-form games
extensive-form rationalizability
prudent rationalizability
iterative conditional dominance
JEL:C70
C72
D80
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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