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|Title:||Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior |
Schipper, Burkhard C.
|Issue Date:||2009 |
|Series/Report no.:||Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 09,10|
|Abstract:||We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.|
iterative conditional dominance
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis|
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