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dc.contributor.authorBonanno, Giacomoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:44Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58378-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is common understanding among the players that they are all rational.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbelief revisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon beliefen_US
dc.subject.keywordcounterfactualen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordmodel of a gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalityen_US
dc.titleReasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717283135en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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