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dc.contributor.authorMeier, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:40Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:40Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58374-
dc.description.abstractApplying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 12,9en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnawarenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordAwarenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordType-spaceen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordBayesianen_US
dc.subject.keywordgamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordEquilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordPerfectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordUndominated equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordWeak dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordInattentionen_US
dc.titleBayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfectionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717284026en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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