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Title:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations PDF Logo
Authors:Bonanno, Giacomo
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,1
Abstract:In a companion paper we introduced a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency. In this paper we provide an epistemic foundation for AGM-consistency based on the AGM theory of belief revision.
Subjects:belief revision
common prior
plausibility order
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
consistency
sequential equilibrium
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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