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Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58371
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bonanno, Giacomo | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-07 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-12T13:33:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-06-12T13:33:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58371 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games 10. Literature Review | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Univ. of California Davis, Calif. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 12,11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Epistemic foundations of game theory | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 717284107 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis
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