Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58371
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dc.contributor.authorBonanno, Giacomoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:36Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:36Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58371-
dc.description.abstractThis is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games 10. Literature Reviewen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of California |cDavis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics |x12,11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleEpistemic foundations of game theoryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717284107en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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