Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58371
Authors: 
Bonanno, Giacomo
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 12,11
Abstract: 
This is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games 10. Literature Review
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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