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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 09-20
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-trade theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagree theorem.
Schlagwörter: 
unawareness
awareness
zero probability
type-space
common prior
agreement
speculative trade
interactive epistemology
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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