Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58369
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dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58369-
dc.description.abstractMorris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of California |cDavis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics |x11,6en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordunawarenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordawarenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordknowledgeen_US
dc.subject.keywordpreferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsubjective expecteden_US
dc.subject.keywordutility theoryen_US
dc.subject.keyworddecision theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordnull eventen_US
dc.titlePreference-dependent unawarenessen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717281752en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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