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Title:Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games PDF Logo
Authors:Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 10,21
Abstract:We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
Subjects:symmetric two-player games
zero-sum games
Rock-Paper-Scissors
single-peakedness
quasiconcavity
finite population evolutionary stable strategy
saddle point
exact potential games
JEL:C72
C73
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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