Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58358
Authors: 
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 10,21
Abstract: 
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
Subjects: 
symmetric two-player games
zero-sum games
Rock-Paper-Scissors
single-peakedness
quasiconcavity
finite population evolutionary stable strategy
saddle point
exact potential games
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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