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Title:Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games PDF Logo
Authors:Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,12
Abstract:We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Subjects:imitate-the-best
learning
exact potential games
symmetric games
relative payoffs
zero-sum games
JEL:C72
C73
D43
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

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