|
EconStor >
University of California (UC) >
UC Davis, Department of Economics >
Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58356
|
| | |
| Title: | | Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games  |
| Authors: | | Duersch, Peter Oechssler, Joerg Schipper, Burkhard |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,12 |
| Abstract: | | We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. |
| Subjects: | | imitate-the-best learning exact potential games symmetric games relative payoffs zero-sum games |
| JEL: | | C72 C73 D43 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58356
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|