Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
Authors: 
Ke, Changxia
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-104
Abstract: 
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.
Subjects: 
conflict
contest
alliance
hold-up problem
experiment
JEL: 
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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