Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
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dc.contributor.authorKe, Changxiaen_US
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMorath, Florianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-11T10:53:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-11T10:53:27Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350-
dc.description.abstractVictorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-104en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordcontesten_US
dc.subject.keywordallianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwBündnissystemen_US
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleAlliances in the shadow of conflicten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717085090en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012104-

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