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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) >
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ke, Changxia | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Konrad, Kai A. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Morath, Florian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-05 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-11T10:53:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-06-11T10:53:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | WZB Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Forschungsprofessur & Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism SP II 2012-104 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | conflict | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | contest | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | alliance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | hold-up problem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bündnissystem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Sunk Costs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Alliances in the shadow of conflict | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 717085090 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012104 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
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