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Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >
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|Title:||Alliances in the shadow of conflict |
Konrad, Kai A.
|Issue Date:||2012 |
|Series/Report no.:||WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-104|
|Abstract:||Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB|
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
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