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Title:Alliances in the shadow of conflict PDF Logo
Authors:Ke, Changxia
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-104
Abstract:Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.
Subjects:conflict
contest
alliance
hold-up problem
experiment
JEL:D72
D74
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"

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