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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Bennyen_US
dc.contributor.authorMause, Karstenen_US
dc.description.abstractMembers of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.en_US
dc.publisherWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-105en_US
dc.titleDelegation, accountability & legislator moonlighting: Agency problems in Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
Alle Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB

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