Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58349
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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Bennyen_US
dc.contributor.authorMause, Karstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-11T10:53:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-11T10:53:25Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58349-
dc.description.abstractMembers of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-105en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAbgeordneteen_US
dc.subject.stwNebentätigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleDelegation, accountability & legislator moonlighting: Agency problems in Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717085457en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012105-

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