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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dur, Robert | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Tichem, Jan | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-05-31 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-06-08T13:57:28Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-06-08T13:57:28Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3826 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | altruism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | spite | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | social relations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | relational contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | efficiency wages | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | subjective performance evaluation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Nash bargaining | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsbeziehungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziale Beziehungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unvollständiger Vertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dynamisches Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Social relations and relational incentives | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 716601540 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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