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dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.contributor.authorTichem, Janen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-08T13:57:28Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-08T13:57:28Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3826en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordspiteen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial relationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiency wagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsubjective performance evaluationen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash bargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSocial relations and relational incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn716601540en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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