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dc.contributor.authorKesternich, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorLange, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Bodoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-04-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-06T13:15:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-06T13:15:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-323070en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58255-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is allocated across agents according to some predetermined rule. We find that rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels relative to the VCM. Important differences exist between the rules. Contrary to theory predictions, the equal-payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other rules. This also holds relative to a scheme where different types of players separately can determine their minimum contribution levels. Our results lend insights into the efficient institutional design for voluntary private provision of public goods, and how burden sharing rules interact with efficiency when agents are heterogeneous.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x12-033en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordminimum contribution rulesen
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneityen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwLastenverteilungen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleThe impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn716916827en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:12033en

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