Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58255
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dc.contributor.authorKesternich, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorLange, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Bodoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-06T13:15:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-06T13:15:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-323070-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58255-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum provision level of the public good that is allocated across agents according to some predetermined rule. We find that rule-based contribution schemes significantly increase payoff levels relative to the VCM. Important differences exist between the rules. Contrary to theory predictions, the equal-payoff rule Pareto-dominates all other rules. This also holds relative to a scheme where different types of players separately can determine their minimum contribution levels. Our results lend insights into the efficient institutional design for voluntary private provision of public goods, and how burden sharing rules interact with efficiency when agents are heterogeneous.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x12-033en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum contribution rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneityen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwLastenverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleThe impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goodsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn716916827en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:12033-

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