Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955
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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien_US
dc.contributor.authorPoutvaara, Panuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-21T10:06:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-21T10:06:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955-
dc.description.abstractGovernment or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Public Choice |x3810en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD52en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelH57en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnominationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen_US
dc.subject.keywordpoliticiansen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen_US
dc.titleA market for connectionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715780948en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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